Why the Immigration Debate Is Misunderstood

In the immediate aftermath of this summer’s riots, the British public considered immigration to be the most important issue facing the country. This sentiment pushed immigration concerns to the forefront, surpassing even the economy for the first time since 2017. The new Labour government has committed to reducing immigration. Conservative leadership hopeful Robert Jenrick aims to cut it to the tens of thousands. Reform, not to be outdone, proposes freezing “non-essential” immigration entirely.

The debate’s terms are inherently flawed. The notion of dramatically reducing or halting immigration is misleading. Regardless of policies, people will continue to come to the UK, and the nation actually needs them. The real choice is between a chaotic, punitive system grounded in political dishonesty and a well-managed one that leverages the UK’s capacity to attract people globally.

Despite significant policy shifts—from relative openness under New Labour in the early 2000s, through Theresa May’s “hostile environment” of the 2010s, to the end of free movement and the introduction of Boris Johnson’s liberal system in the 2020s—migration to the UK has been historically high for the past 25 years. The UK is not unique in this; the proportion of the population originating from abroad is almost identical to that in France or Germany.

This illustrates that factors beyond mere policy are at play here—primarily economic and demographic. The native-born labor force in advanced economies is shrinking. In the UK, almost all employment growth over the last two decades—more than 4 million people—has been from those born abroad. With fertility rates below replacement level and the over-65 population set to increase by 5 million over the next 20 years, these pressures will only intensify. Without immigration, the number of people paying taxes will shrink just as the number needing state support grows. This mix is unsustainable.

Theoretically, a shrinking workforce and growing elderly population could be managed with very low immigration levels through increased automation or accepting economic stagnation. Examples such as Japan and Korea suggest this is difficult. Despite historically low migration and relatively closed cultures, both countries’ immigration has risen rapidly, driven by labor market pressures. They are now working to attract migrants for both manual and skilled jobs because their prosperity and well-being depend on it.

High migration levels seem inevitable, but politics and policy remain crucial. There are broadly three options.

The first is restrictionism: tight controls on legal migration for work and study, allowing only the most highly skilled to stay, and no safe or legal routes for refugees. However, the laws of supply and demand mean many will still come and stay, slipping into the grey zone of irregularity and the informal economy. The result will be marginalization, exclusion, and exploitation—not only of irregular migrants but also of legal residents working in the same sectors. Paradoxically, this would provide more fodder for anti-immigration politicians.

The second is advocated by those who recognize the economic need for legal immigration but worry about its impact on national identity. They would allow all but the most highly skilled workers to come on temporary contracts, ensuring immigration doesn’t result in permanent population change. However, experiences like Germany’s Gastarbeiter program show that this is impractical. People tend to put down roots, and our societies aren’t segregated enough to make this work. This option would also result in a growing irregular population or necessitate amnesties and other ad hoc responses.

Our current mix of migration policies—better described as a collection rather than a strategy—includes elements of both these approaches. The previous government oversaw performative cruelty toward asylum seekers, expanded temporary worker schemes for agriculture, and imposed increasingly onerous requirements for family visas and those who wish to settle permanently.

Yet, despite some politically charged rhetoric, we still maintain a relatively transparent and liberal work visa scheme. The graduate visa for international students remains, although the events of the past few weeks have made it harder to attract those who have other options.

With a new government in place, a third option could emerge. Recognizing the UK’s attractiveness to migrants as a major comparative advantage, not a problem, could mark the beginning. The country’s open economy, a global city like London, and the English language make it an ideal destination. Additionally, its historical connections with countries like India and Nigeria, each with a large number of well-educated young people looking for opportunities, should inspire hope and optimism, not fear.

To move forward, there needs to be honesty about the inevitability of high migration levels and its economic necessities, such as avoiding mass automation or stagnation. It should remain legal and regulated, but there must also be a conversation about social consequences beyond the concept of simply stopping inflow.

Thankfully, the UK is not irredeemably divided along ethnic, racial, or religious lines despite some current scaremongering. However, managing a multi-ethnic democracy amid continued high migration requires effort, especially given political figures actively working against it. Integration needs to be taken seriously. This could start with restoring funding for English classes for new arrivals, moving recognized refugees from isolated hotels into homes and jobs quickly, and reversing proposed changes that would allow faith schools to select entirely based on religion. A system that works for both longstanding residents and new migrants is possible, and it is high time to debate that.